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DISCRIMINATION, JOBS, AND POLITICS: THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE THE
NEW DEAL. By Paul Burstein. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press. 1985. Pp. x, 199. Cloth, $30; paper $12.95.
Paul Burstein's 1 Discrimination, Jobs, and Politics is a historical,
political, and sociological examination of America's struggle to equalize job opportunities for minorities and for women after World War
II. Specifically, Burstein examines a variety of societal factors and the
ways in which these factors influenced congressional consideration
and eventual passage of equal employment opportunity ("EEO") legislation in 1964 and again in 1972. Thus, the entire analysis centers on
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19642 and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972. 3
Burstein has divided the ·study into two unequal parts. The first
section, comprising roughly two-thirds of the book's pages, contains
the analytical substance. In this section, Burstein attempts to consider
systematically all societal factors that may have had an impact on congressional consideration of EEO legislation. The analysis focuses
upon factors such as public opinion, congressional leadership, violent
and nonviolent civil rights protests (as well as anti-rights counter demonstrations), media coverage, lobbying, and elections. While not attempting to establish a solid causal link between any single factor, or
group of factors, and congressional activity, Burstein does attempt to
determine which factors contributed most substantially to congressional passage of EEO legislation.
In its study of congressional passage of EEO legislation, the work
fits neatly into a crowded field of literature that analyzes the legislative
history of equal employment legislation.4 Because it necessarily treats
the 1960s civil rights movement as well, this study also contributes to
a body of work describing the effect of civil rights protests and demonstrations on society. 5
However, Burstein's analysis does more than simply trace the history behind the passage of two pieces of EEO legislation. In the last
1. Associate Professor of Sociology, University of Washington.
2. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 244 (codified in various sections of 42 U.S.C.).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17.
4. See, e.g., R. BARDOLPH, THE CIVIL RIGHTS RECORD (1970); Bonfield, The Origin and
Development of American Fair Employment Legislation, 52 IOWA L. REv. 1043 (1967); Kohl,
Equal Employment Opportunity in America: An Historical Past and Emerging Trends, 36 LAB.
L.J. 835 (1985).
5. See, e.g., J. BU'ITON, BLACK VIOLENCE: POLITICAL IMPACT OF THE 1960's RIOTS
(1978); N. Schlei, Foreword to B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAW at vii-xiii (1976).
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portion of Discrimination, Jobs, and Politics, Burstein examines current statistics and, relying on conclusions made in the first portion of
the work, attempts to provide predictions about future hopes for
equality of employment opportunities in the United States. By noting
current trends, Burstein reaches conclusions about attainable goals
for, and probable limitations on, equality in employment opportunities.
At this second level, Burstein's work becomes one of more than
historical significance; it serves as a guide to expectations concerning
EEO. But just as the first section was not a radical departure from the
subject of previous work, neither does the second section chart unnavigated waters. Rather, Burstein's predictions fit nicely alongside those
of Farley, 6 Lazear, 7 and others who attempt to determine what the
future holds for groups who have traditionally been the victims of discrimination in the workplace.
What distinguishes Burstein's work from those that simply study
the history of legislation or examine current trends is Burstein's use of
the single case study as a vehicle to facilitate an examination of the
democratic process. Among political theorists, a substantial division
has arisen concerning the importance of public opinion as a factor influencing political decisionmaking. Simplifying the complex arguments to a great extent, the basic disagreement is between those who
believe that public opinion does have a substantial effect on congressional activity, 8 and those who adhere to the notion that Congress basically follows a hidden agenda, the contents of which are determined
by the wealthy and by well-organized interest groups. 9 According to
this latter hypothesis, any similarity between the wishes of the public
and congressional activity is largely coincidental. By examining the
strength of the relation between changes in public opinion and shifts in
congressional activity, Burstein is able to determine that, at least in the
case of EEO legislation in the 1960s and 1970s, public opinion played
a major, if not the crucial, role in producing legislative action.
Before examining a portion of Burstein's argument in detail, it is
important to understand the basic methodology of the study. The first
section, which reaches the conclusions about the relative importance
of factors, relies almost exclusively upon the use of statistics and statistical analysis. Burstein first gathered as much data as was available
6. Farley, Trends in Racial Inequalities: Have the Gains of the 1960's Disappeared in the
1970's?, 42 AM. Soc. REV. 189 (1977).
7. Lazear, The Narrowing ofBlack-White Wage Differentials is Illusory, 69 AM. EcoN. REV.
553 (1979).
8. While this view is modified and slightly different for each adherent, Burstein cites
Kingdon, Models of Legislative Voting, 39 J. POL. 563 (1977), and R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO
DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956), among others, as supporters of this position.
9. See, e.g., I. KATZNEl.SON & M. KESSELMAN, THE POLITICS OF POWER (1975); c. MILLS,
THE POWER ELITE (1956).
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about each variable included in the study. Then, primarily through
the use of cross-tabulations and regression analyses, Burstein compared the selective variables in order to determine which had the
strongest correlations with levels of congressional EEO-related activity. Precise and plentiful information was not available for each variable and this forced the author to use some data that may not have
precisely represented the concepts being examined. 10 However, at
least enough data was available to make these statistical comparisons
numerically significant.
The general thrust of the statistical conclusions is that, while a variety of factors contributed to Congress' eventual decision to pass EEO
legislation, by far the most important factor was public opinion. On
the surface this seems to be a less than startling conclusion, but it does
challenge some traditional interpretations.
Perhaps the most convincing and persuasive portions of Burstein's
analysis center on his treatment of the effect of civil rights protest activities.11 The author first examines the statistical relationship between congressional support for EEO legislation and the level of civil
rights activity (and accompanying counter-activity and media attention). While admitting that civil righ~s activities had an effect on congressional consideration, especially in increasing the salience of
equality issues, Burstein's statistics indicate that "[t]he primary determinant of congressional activity was public opinion. The civil rights
movement (and the associated anti-rights activity and media coverage)
seems to have had only a slight direct effect on congressional support
for EEO ...." 12
Burstein buttresses these statistical conclusions with other convincing evidence. First, Burstein notes that EEO legislation was not
anything "new" to the 1960s; bills suggesting equality of job opportunity had been sponsored in Congress during every session since 194142 (pp. 32-34). Second, while sponsorship did increase during the
early 1960s, prior to passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and in
conjunction with extensive protest activity, congressional sponsorship
of EEO legislation reached its highest levels in the early 1970s. This
10. See text following note 14 infra.
11. It is important to note that there is a distinction between broad civil rights demonstrations and those more focused, usually smaller, demonstrations concerned exclusively with EEO.
While Burstein notes that congressional support was strongly correlated with highly focused
EEO protests, it is his conclusions concerning broader civil rights protests, pushing generally for
equality among the races, that are discussed here. Pp. 82-96.
12. P. 90. This point would be less striking if, as Garrow indicates, the civil rights movement
itself caused public opinion to change. D. GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA: MARTIN LUTHER
KING, JR., AND THE VOTING RIGHTS Ac:r OF 1965, at 178 (1978). However, Burstein finds that
"the civil rights and women's movements were neither a major cause nor a direct consequence of
changes in public opinion." P. 89. Overall, the author concludes that "[i]t is fairly obvious (and
statistical analysis confirms) that over the entire period the relation of collective action and media
coverage to pro-EEO activities is zero." P. 88.
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high level of congressional support occurred even though civil rights
protest activities were not nearly so common in the 1970s (pp. 84-85).
Third, Burstein notes that virtually all civil rights protest activity
pushed for equality among the races, thus providing no key as to why
the eventual legislation also extended protection to individuals suffering from discrimination based upon national origin, religion, and sex
(p. 94). Finally, the content of the legislation that Congress eventually
passed is noticeably similar to much of the earlier legislation that was
sponsored but never adopted (p. 38). The civil rights movement therefore did not have a highly significant effect on either the timing or the
content of EEO legislation (p. 94).
What makes this conclusion so interesting is that many analysts
see the equality-related legislation of the mid-1960s as a direct outgrowth of the crisis brought to the public's attention by civil rights
protest activities. 13 Burstein's analysis indicates that at least one section of this ACt, Title VII, was more a response to shifts in nationwide
opinion than a result of protest activities. Burstein concedes that the
civil rights movement was in large part responsible for focusing the
public's attention on the problems of inequality and for convincing
Congress of the salience of equality issues. However, he is persuasive
in arguing that the passage of EEO legislation in 1964, and especially
in 1972, was more a result of long-term alterations in public attitudes
and perceptions than of concentrated demonstrations by civil rights
activists. 14
While a paucity of hard data may not completely undermine the
validity of Burstein's findings, one must examine and question the statistics used to represent the chosen variables before accepting the conclusions with any confidence. In many situations, it is unclear that the
statistics chosen by Burstein adequately represent the concept being
defined. For example, as a measure of congressional responsiveness to
EEO, Burstein uses the number of senators and representatives sponsoring EEO legislation in each session. While congressional sponsorship is probably a fairly accurate indicator of the level of congressional
support in most instances, it is not difficult to imagine situations in
which senators or representatives might opt not to sponsor legislation
while still supporting the cause. Perhaps a larger statistical flaw centers on the data used to indicate levels of support for EEO among the
general public. Because often little or no data on this specific issue is
13. J. BUiTON, supra note 5; w. GAMSON, THE STRATEGY OF SOCIAL PROTEST (1975).
14. Having shown that congressional action was primarily a result ofa gradual shift in public
opinion and that the civil rights movement did not produce this change in attitudes about EEO,
the next logical step would be to explain what factors did cause this change. Although the
question of what caused public opinion to shift over time becomes extremely relevant, Burstein
does not attempt to deal with it. Instead, he notes that "at the moment we have few ideas and
even less evidence about what has caused attitudes to change. This is an area that demands
further research." P. 93.
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available, Burstein frequently relies on general attitudes towards racial
equality. The fit is not perfect, as people are much more apt to favor a
general principle, like equality, than a specific remedy, like Title VII
(p. 42). Thus, while the accumulated data is able to produce statistically significant results, there is some question as to whether the numbers used really do represent the variables being studied.
The second half of the study does not rely nearly so heavily upon
statistical methods, and thus avoids the problem of disjunction between variable and data. In this section, Burstein examines data relating to several social factors in order to make predictions about the
future of EEO. While Burstein notes that fewer members of the general public maintain discriminatory attitudes and the public is now
more accepting of EEO legislation, he suggests that the gains made by
blacks and women, relative to white males, will continue to be modest
(pp. 175-76). Primarily because of differences in education, erratic enforcement of the EEO .legislation, the structure of the economy, and
generational gaps (the white males in the most socially desirable positions got their jobs before EEO legislation had been passed) the income gap is destined to close slowly (pp. 157-71).
The second section does not have the same problem with finding
truly representational data as the first section, but it does nonetheless
suffer from other serious flaws. Primary among these flaws is the datedness of the analysis. While the book was not published until 1985, it
was the result of an extended period of research and statistical analysis. Thus, the statistics considered, the arguments made, and the authorities cited are all slightly outdated. Although the ratios of black
and female earnings to those of white males have not changed dramatically since the late 1970s, (the period from which most of Burstein's
figures come) the slight changes in the numbers, coupled with an economic situation much different from that of the late 1970s, makes a
more up-to-date study preferable. 15
A final drawback to this latter portion of the analysis is Burstein's
almost total refusal to consider the role the courts play in determining
how equal the employment opportunities will be. In chapter two, Burstein's initial hypothesis as to why the tide of public opinion began to
change in the early 1940s rests upon a perceived (and actual) willingness on the part of the Supreme Court to sustain legal attacks against
discrimination (pp. 16-17). Given this initial point, it is difficult to
understand why Burstein, at the end of his analysis, fails to consider
the critical role the current courts play, both in shaping public expectations and in enforcing the EEO legislation. Supreme Court decisions
15. See, e.g., Jeffries & McGahey, Equity, Growth and Socioeconomic Change: Anti-Discrimination Policy in an Era of Economic Transformation, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 233
(1985); Jones, Some Reflections on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 at Twenty, 36 MERCER L. REV. 13 (1985).
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such as McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 16 Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 17 and United Steelworkers v. Weber, 18 have established the basic
and essential standards that employers must meet in order to be within
the laws Burstein studies. Changes in the Supreme Court's interpretations will necessarily have dramatic effects on the development of
EEO, but Burstein almost completely ignores this dynamic.
Burstein's work is undoubtedly engaging, largely because he challenges the easy assumptions one is inclined to make about congressional decisionmaking. He shows Congress may not always be swayed
by only the well-heeled elite, and, at least in this instance, congressional decisions follow long periods of thoughtful consideration.
Nevertheless, the work fails to accomplish all that it could have.
After meticulous statistical analysis leading to the fairly persuasive
conclusion that public opinion does in fact influence congressional
decisionmaking, Burstein fails to take the analysis one step further and
discuss the factors producing these opinion changes. If, in fact, the
most substantial factor in congressional decisionmaking is public opinion, the most fundamental inquiry then must be into the factors influencing public opinion. Burstein's primary goal in writing this book
was to provide an answer to the question of why this nation chose to
adopt EEO legislation. The analysis persuasively indicates that Congress adopted EEO legislation when it did because of public opinion.
However, that begs the larger question. Why did public opinion
change so significantly in the period between 1940 and 1964? This is
the question that Burstein's study pushes inexorably towards, but fails
to answer.
-

James L. Thompson

16. 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (setting forth the relatively easy standards a plaintiff must meet in
order to establish a prima facie case under Title VII).
,
17. 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (establishing the "disparate impact" theory under Title VII, which
generally allows employers to be held liable whenever an employment policy has a disproportion·
ately harmful effect on members of a protected group, regardless of the employer's intent).
18. 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (holding that Title VII does not prohibit employers from voluntarily
adopting race-conscious affirmative action plans).

